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Abstract 
With the internet boom of early 2000 making access to trading the Foreign Exchange (FX) 
market far simpler for members of the general public, the growth of ‘retail’ FX trading 
continues, with daily transaction volumes as high as $200 billion.  Potential new entrants to 
the retail FX trading world may come from the recent UK pension deregulations, further 
increasing the volumes.  The attraction of FX trading is that it offers high returns and whilst it 
has been understood that it is high-risk in nature, the rewards are seen as being 
commensurately high for the ‘skilled and knowledgeable’ trader who has an edge over other 
market participants.   This paper analyses a number of independent sources of data and 
previous research, to examine the profitability of the Retail FX trader and compares the 
results with that of a simulated random trading models. This paper finds evidence to suggest 
that whilst approximately 20% of traders can expect to end up with a profitable account, 
around 40% might expect their account to be subject to a margin call.   This paper finds a 
strong correlation between the overall profitability of traders and impact of the cost of the 
bid-ask spread, whilst finding little if any evidence that retail FX traders, when viewed as a 
group, are achieving results better than that from random trading. 
 
The Retail FX Trader – an Introduction 
Foreign Exchange (FX) trading is at its simplest, the use of one currency to buy another.  A 
US tourist wishing to visit Great Britain would go to their local bank and sell their ‘United 
States Dollars’ (USD), to buy ‘Great British Pounds’ (GBP), which in the FX world would be 
a ‘buy  GBP/USD’ transaction.  In the case of this tourist, the transaction allows purchases of 
goods and services to be made more convenient once on British soil, however if the FX 
trading world, such a transaction would be made to attempt to profit from a belief that the 
Pound (GBP) is likely to strengthen in value relative to that of the Dollar (USD). The scale of 
the market for such transactions is huge.  According to the Bank for International 
Settlement’s 2013 Triennial survey (BIS 2013), trading in the foreign exchange markets 
averaged $5.3 trillion per day in April 2013, up from $4.0 trillion in April 2010 and $3.3 
trillion in April 2007. 
 
 The FX market is made up of various players (King, Michael R, Carol Osler 2011) who need 
or want access to such a market.  Amongst the list of players, including financial institutions, 
corporations and high-frequency algorithmic traders is a growing section of private 
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individuals who wish to trade the FX market either for trading gain or perhaps to hedge the 
impact of a currency move against a large foreign purchase, for example a holiday home 
abroad. These ‘non-financial customers’ account for between 8-10% of the spot FX market 
(King & Rime 2010) which in 2010 was estimated to be $125-150 billion per day.  The 2013 
BIS Triennial survey also suggests a figure of 9% for retail traders, which given the growth in 
the overall FX market between 2010 and 2013 would suggest a daily figure for ‘retail 
trading’ of closer to between $165  - 200 billion per day.    
Growth in the retail sector has been fuelled by the advent of on-line platforms, which started 
around the year 2000 and with it brought lower transaction costs via new type of financial 
intermediary, the ‘retail aggregator’.   These aggregators offer significant leverage to the 
retail trader, allowing trades of up to 500 times that of the underlying deposit, so for example 
a trader with a modest account containing say a $2,000 deposit (“margin”) would have the 
ability, via leverage, to trade up to $1,000,000 of currency.    These aggregators are 
colloquially known as ‘brokers’, which implies that a trade (and so risk) is offset in the wider 
market place, however many of these brokers have a hybrid ‘dealing’ model where they in 
effect ‘take the other side of the trade’, with implication on both potential profitability and 
risk, especially given the leverage they have provided to the retail client.  In 2015, one of the 
UK’s largest brokers ‘Alpari UK’ went into receivership due to the effects of a significant 
announcement by the Swiss National Bank (SNB) and the effect that had on the Swiss franc, 
resulting in a $225m loss of client funds (BBC 2015a). 
 
The attraction to the retail trader of the FX market include ease of access, 24 hour trading 5 
days a week, the perceived low transaction costs and access to leveraged accounts.  A cursory 
glance at the advertising used to entice new retail traders into the FX market will undoubtedly 
build on these factors and try and build a seductive picture around the ability to ‘trade your 
way to financial freedom’.   Recent changes to the UK pension rules, allowing over-55’s to 
withdraw money from their pension pot and ‘invest’ or spend it as they see fit (BBC 2015b) 
may well serve to increase the number of individuals wishing to trade FX, especially if the 
see trading as a route to top up their underperforming pension pot.  However despite the 
seeming attraction of this market, what is not clear is the number of retail traders that are 
profitable, nor the extent to which they are profitable.  The heady mix of access to pension 
capital combined with seductive marketing and a lack of understanding of risk could prove to 
be another financial time-bomb waiting to explode.  This paper attempts to provide answers 
to those questions and in addition to try and establish if the results obtained by retail traders is 
any better than that of random trading? 
 
Is the FX Market a Random Walk? 
Before we examine the profitability of the retail trader, we should consider the question of 
whether the FX market has any level of predictability at all?  The seminal work, conducted in 
the early Eighties by Meese and Rogoff (Meese & Rogoff 1983) which looked at forecasting 
accuracy in exchange rates concluded “We find that a random walk model performs as well 
as any estimated model at one to twelve month horizons”.  Subsequently this question of 
whether exchange rates follow a random walk has been much debated.  The conclusions of 
the Meese / Rogoff paper were subsequently challenged  (Somanath 1986) stating that “while 
the random walk is the dominant model during the period and for the structural models 
examined by Meese and Rogoff, it is subordinate to some of those models during the post 
Meese and Rogoff period”.  Further work  (Hakkio 1986) stated that “some evidence suggest 
the exchange rate follows a random walk, while other evidence suggests the opposite should 
be true” before concluding that “although the hypothesis that the exchange rate follows a 
random walk cannot be rejected, not much weight should be put on that conclusion”.  Nearly 
two decades after the original work, Kilian and Taylor (Kilian & Taylor 2003) developed a 
test to investigate the random walk hypothesis and found “strong evidence of predictability at 
horizons of 2 to 3 years, but not at shorter horizons”.   
 
Whilst these studies of exchange rate forecasting efficacy do provide evidence to support the 
non-random nature of the currency exchange rate market, there is a striking difference 
between the time frame of the predictability in Kilian and Taylor’s research (“2 to 3 years”) 
and the time horizons of the retail trader as recorded by Heimer and Simon “Roughly half of 
all positions were closed within an hour and only around ten percent lasted longer than a 
day”.  Research into forecasting of shorter term exchange rates using ‘Technical Analysis’ 
and ‘Artificial Intelligence’ tools (Dempster et al. 2001) concluded that their results ‘imply 
that there is useful information in technical indicators that can be exploited’ whilst at the 
same time commenting that ‘none of the methods produce significant profits at realistic 
transaction costs’.   However there is potential ‘good news’ for the retail trader, a study 
looking at the combination of forecasting techniques (Yu et al. 2005) appears to have some 
hope for profitable trading.  By combining an ‘expert system’ focusing on eleven basic 
factors related to forex price fluctuation and a ‘neural network’ focusing on price trend 
analysis they created a system that produced one of 3 decisions; buy, sell or deposit across 3 
different currencies, with headline results being an annual return of between 13.52% and 
15.13% based on testing of out-of-sample data.   It appears that there is some evidence to 
support the non-random nature of the FX market although the question of the timescales over 
which this non-random behaviour exists still remains and the repeatability of the results. 
 
How successful are Retail Traders? 
The question of just how many retail FX traders are profitable has been the subject of much 
speculation for some time.  The common meme, often cited on trading related social media, is 
that “95% of traders lose money” however, despites its frequent use to support the sales of 
‘how to trade profitably’ courses, there is little evidence to support this specific number.  
Research into the day trading of stocks in the US (Jordan & Diltz 2003) concluded that from 
a sample of 324 traders, 35.8% were profitable after 20 months with 64.2% having lost 
money.  A more recent and larger study into the use of social media by 5,693 retail FX 
traders (Heimer & Simon 2012) tracked the online trading results across a 2 year period, from 
January 2009 to December 2010 and concluded that only 21% of traders were profitable at 
the end of the period.   This data, taken from the real time tracking of trades posted on the on-
line trader portal “MyFXBook” (MyFXBook 2015) also showed that despite the low 
profitability at the end of the period, individual trades were actually profitable 63.4% of the 
time!  We will examine more of the findings from this study later in this paper. 
 Although no complete picture exists, there are other insights into how profitable retail traders 
might be.  In America, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010 (Dodd Frank 2010) required retail FX brokers to report each quarter the number of 
accounts which were profitable or non-profitable.  This quarterly data has been collected 
from each broker and aggregated by the on-line website Finance Magnates (Finance 
Magnates 2015). Analysis of this data from 19 US brokers, between Q4 2010 and Q1 2014 
shows that across a mean quarterly total of 103,437 accounts, the mean number of profitable 
accounts was 33.4%, with the highest quarter for any individual broker being 46.5%, or to put 
in another way, at no point during 14 quarters did any of the 19 brokers have more profitable 
client accounts than unprofitable ones! 
 
Broker Profitability data 
 
 
More evidence comes from the analysis of 23 forex trading competitions which ran between 
May 2010 and November 2014.  The competitions, also hosted by the retail FX trader portal 
MyFXBook, allow traders of all levels to compete against each other, usually for the duration 
of a month, using ‘demo’ trading accounts provided by the sponsoring broker.  These demo 
accounts allow a trader to trade using virtual money, rather than risking real funds.  Over the 
23 competitions we analysed, 41,529 active traders took part, with on average only 21.9% 
finishing in profit at the end of the month, despite 66.8% of all individual trades being 
profitable.  Overall 50% of all accounts dropped to below 20% of the opening funding level 
during the competition, which if trading real funds would have resulted in a request for more 
funds to be added (known as a “margin call”) or in the account being closed due to 
insufficient funds.  
 
 
Competition Profitability data 
 
 
Whilst it can be argued that trading with virtual money may result in more aggressive risk 
taking, it is interesting to observe the parallels between these results and those of the Heimer, 
Simon 2011 study, both in terms of profitable traders (21.9%,  21.0%) and profitable 
individual trades (66.8%,  63.4%).  It should be noted that both of these sets of data include 
traders that may have stopped trading during the relevant period, for example because they 
have lost too much money or been margin called and had their account closed.  The quarterly 
US broker data, on the other hand, will not show data for account that were closed in 
previous quarters (because the accounts are no longer in existence), which might help explain 
the seemingly higher profitability level of 33.4%?   
 
It is difficult and dangerous to put a precise number as to the success of retail FX traders.  
The analysis above suggests that between 20% and 33% of traders are profitable, or rather 
that between 20% and 33% of trading accounts were in profit at the time their measurement 
took place.  It is interesting to consider why this figure is so low given that a) a given 
currency pair can only go one of two ways, higher or lower, seemingly a 50/50 bet and b) 
why traders get the buy-or-sell decision right nearly two-thirds of the time, yet still lose 
money?   
 
Broker Date Active Traders Margin called Positive Positive 
Accounts % Accounts % Trades %
FXCM Nov-14 2,444 45.0% 19.7% 69.5%
Squared Financial Aug-14 2,394 48.0% 17.7% 69.0%
Octa FX Jun-14 2,247 35.0% 12.6% 70.5%
24 FX May-14 1,760 45.0% 13.1% 63.5%
Forex Broker May-14 164 56.0% 11.6% 59.5%
Tenko FX Mar-14 2,804 44.0% 17.2% 67.0%
Price Markets Dec-13 1,879 55.0% 16.1% 64.0%
Excel Markets Sep-13 2,812 39.0% 13.9% 66.5%
Andromex Jun-13 2,607 49.0% 16.5% 65.0%
FxPro May-13 2,986 43.0% 17.1% 70.0%
OANDA Mar-13 1,583 78.0% 56.1% 69.0%
FIBO Feb-13 2,330 47.0% 20.1% 70.0%
FXCM Nov-12 2,175 52.0% 21.8% 64.5%
I am FX Sep-12 1,824 54.0% 19.6% 62.5%
OANDA Jun-12 1,067 85.0% 61.8% 68.0%
FXCM May-12 1,708 44.0% 12.3% 63.5%
DF Markets Mar-12 1,828 59.0% 31.0% 72.5%
Vantage FX Feb-12 1,914 58.0% 34.8% 74.0%
Go Markets Sep-11 1,299 44.0% 17.2% 65.5%
FXCM Jul-11 1,021 56.0% 27.0% 64.5%
FX Open Mar-11 891 43.0% 11.2% 66.0%
FX Open Oct-10 371 40.0% 17.9% 68.5%
FXDD May-10 1,419 32.0% 17.7% 63.5%
Total 41,529 50.0% 21.9% 66.8%
The Negative Sum Game 
To establish what might be behind these profitability figures, let us look at the mechanics of 
an FX trade.  Foreign Exchange prices are based around a pair of currencies, the currency 
being sold and the currency being bought.  For example the EUR/USD “Euro Dollar” might 
be quoted at 1.1500, meaning that for every dollar you have (the ‘USD’ base currency) you 
will receive 1.1500 Euros (‘EUR’).  For this transaction to take place, two parties are 
required, someone that can provide Euros and someone that has Dollars and importantly, 
these two parties must agree on a value at which they are happy to buy and sell.   The size of 
the FX market means that there are likely to always be many parties who wish to buy and sell 
at any time (“high liquidity”) and it is the job of the brokers and the functioning of the market 
to bring these parties together.   FX price quotations actually consist of two prices, the ‘Bid’ 
and the ‘Ask’.   The Ask price is the price at which a party who wishes to buy a currency can 
do so, for example Euros were available at 1.1500.  The Bid price is the level at which a party 
can sell the Euros they have, and this is normally lower that the Ask price, for example 
1.1498.  The difference between these two levels is known as the ‘Bid-Ask spread’.  Each 
unit of price movement is known as a ‘pip’ (Price Interest Point) and the bid-ask spread, 
simply referred to as the ‘spread’ , is quoted in pips, in the example above 2 pips.  The 
monetary value of a pip will depend on the size of the trade placed, or ‘lot size’ and the base 
currency, with a lot size of 1 being equivalent to $10 per pip movement for USD 
denominated currency pairs. This ‘spread’ flows to the broker who is providing the service of 
bringing the parties together and as such providing liquidity.  In most cases brokers do not 
charge any other fees for trades not held overnight. 
 
Let us consider a buy trade on the EURUSD has taken place and the Euro proceeds to 
strengthen 10 pips in relationship to the Dollar.  The trader who bought the Euros in the 
EURUSD transaction will be seeing the value of their trade increasing, whilst the selling 
party will be seeing an equivalent loss in value.  This would seem like a zero-sum game, with 
one party gaining at the others expense, however when the trades are closed, the buyer, who 
bought at the Asking price, now has to sell at the Bid price, thus incurring a drop in the profit 
equivalent to the spread.  The trader on the losing side will also experience such a loss, as 
they have to buy at the Ask to close out their ‘sell at the bid’ transaction.  The net of this is 
that every trade will carry a transactional cost equivalent to the spread, which is paid to the 
broker for their service.  In Heimer and Simon’s 2011 study of over 2,149,038 trades from 
5,693 traders, split into two groups, they noted that “Despite clear differences in their 
commitment to trading, both groups are unprofitable losing on average $6.20 per trade.”  
These figures suggest that over $13 million flowed out of the game, but how much of this can 
be accounted for simply by spreads? 
 
The Anatomy of the Bid-Ask Spread 
The size of the gap between the Bid and Ask price varies from broker to broker, currency pair 
to currency pair and from price quotation to price quotation.  For very highly traded 
currencies, the spread is likely to be lower, reflecting the reduced risk of the broker being 
unable to find a trader to take the other side of the trade.  During times of high volatility, such 
as the release of governmental economic data which can severely impact currency price, the 
spread is likely to be much higher, to reflect the broker risk from very rapid price movements.  
In order to obtain accurate spread data, a monitoring application was written which recorded 
the spread level for every price change (known as a ‘tick’).  This software monitored the 
changes in spread levels being provided across four currency pairs by three retail FX brokers 
during a five day period in March 2015. Below is the graph of a typical week of spreads 
offered by one broker, with the lower line representing the lowest spread seen during a given 
hour, the top line being the highest spread and the middle line being the mean spread of all 
the tick data gathered during that hour.   
 
 
 
In this example, the lowest spread seen was 1.2 pips, the highest 6.0 pips and the mean value 
2.1 pips.  A trader trading 1 Lot ($100,000 of currency) would have therefore have paid 
between $12 and $60 as the spread, depending on the time at which they bought or sold the 
currency.   
 
To try and establish how much of Heimer and Simon’s $6.20 loss per trade was due to the 
spread we need to know both the mean spread in pips paid by the traders during the study and 
the mean Lot size of each transaction.  The latter figure is given, being a mean trade size of 
$34,580, or 0.3458 lots.  No spread data is given, and indeed given the size of the study it is 
likely that many tens of brokers and currency pairs would need to be taken into consideration.  
To try and estimate what a typical spread might have been, the collected spread data from the 
three monitored broker accounts has been used.  This represents the 4 major currency pairs 
(EURUSD, USDJPY, GBPUSD, USDCHF) that accounted for 55% of all currency 
transactions in 2010 (2013 BIS Triennial survey). 
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By using the mean, monitored spread for each currency pair and working out the implied 
dollar value from the lots sized used in the Heimer – Simon study and the mean dollar 
exchange rate during the two year period, we can calculate a range of spread costs for the 
typical trade ranging from $5.08 to $12.51, depending on the currency pair being traded.  If 
we now weight these spreads by the popularity of these four currencies in 2010, we obtain a 
weighted mean spread cost of $6.25 per trade, compared to the observed loss of $6.20 loss 
per trade seen in the original study.   
To help judge the significance (or otherwise) of the delta between the observed $6.20 loss in 
the study and the calculated $6.25 loss, the graph below plots the profitability per trade that 
would have been seen if the traders had demonstrated a net ‘edge’ over a 50% ‘random’ 
outcome.  Based on a representative 20 pip target, to close either a winning or losing trade, a 
shift in the percentage of profitable trades from 50% to 51% would have seen the calculated 
mean profit per trade changes from -$6.45 to -$4.82, with a 49% win rate increasing the net 
loss to -$7.67.   The study observed an overall net profitability of -$6.20, comfortably 
between the effects of a 1% shift from purely random results.   
 
 
 
The existence of systematic trading costs, such as the spread, demonstrate the ‘negative sum’ 
nature of the market that the retail trader is engaged with.  The findings that the group of 
Currency Pair BIS share Weighted Spread Broker 1 Spread Broker 2 Spread Broker 3 (Mean Spread) Spread Cost ( $)
EUR/USD 27.70% 50.09% 1.609 1.13 1.671 1.470 $5.083
USD/JPY 14.30% 25.86% 1.6493 1.496 1.598 1.581 $6.370
GBP/USD 9.10% 16.46% 2.295 1.79 2.12 2.068 $7.151
USD/CHF 4.20% 7.59% 3.6 3.63 3.35 3.527 $12.509
Total 55.30% 100.00%  $6.248
traders in the study appeared not to be able to beat the effect of the spread costs may suggest 
that there is very little non-random behaviour in the timeframes being traded? There is also 
no evidence from the data to show a net beneficial effect across multiple traders in the way 
you might expect to see if say a group of share traders benefited from the rise of the global 
economy being reflected in share prices.  It is also worth noting that the group of traders in 
the study was not a closed group, competing against each other for the same funds, where a 
net-zero outcome (excluding spread) would be expected.  The group was selected simply 
because they had chosen to post their trades publically during the time of the study.  They 
represented as a group a very small proportion of all the traders trading FX at that time, yet 
their results still represented a net profit (loss) very close to the calculated value for random 
‘50% probability’ trading.   
 
A Theoretical Trading Model 
If netting out the spread costs shows that FX trading is a zero sum game, with winners on one 
side and losers on the other, is there any evidence to show that the winners are winning as a 
result of increased skill or knowledge and that losers could alter their fate by acquiring 
similar ability?  How would the results seen in the Heimer – Simon study compare if purely 
random trading during that time was assumed, with no increased skill or knowledge being 
applied? 
 
It is useful to build a mathematical model to help examine the effect that different parameters 
have on overall profitability.  Assuming that any individual trade has one of two outcomes, it 
closes as a winning trade or as a losing trade, with the magnitude of that win (or loss) being 
controlled by the point at which the trade is closed, either in real-time by the trader or using 
pre-set ‘take profit’ or ‘stop out for a loss’ (stop loss) targets.  If the trade is a winner, the 
amount won is a function of the number of pips gained (how much the currency price moved 
in your favour), how much each pip was worth in absolute currency terms (the Lot size) and 
the cost of the trade in terms of the spread and any other transaction costs.  The same 
calculation is carried out for the scenario where the trade is a loser, recognising that the 
number of pips targeted for a win (the take profit target) does not have to be the same as the 
cut-off point for a losing trade (the stop loss target).  For each trade you factor in the 
probability of any trade being a winner.  By summing this equation across all trades taken 
you get the following formula for monetary gain from a set of trades; 
 
∑ (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑊𝑖𝑛 × 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑃𝑖𝑝𝑠 − (1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑊𝑖𝑛) × 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑖𝑝𝑠 − 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑃𝑖𝑝𝑠
𝑁𝑜𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠
1
) × 𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 
× 𝑃𝑖𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑙 
 Where; 
 ProbWin is the probability of a given trade being a winner 
 WinPips is the number of pips won if the trade is a winner) 
 LosePips is the number of pips lost if the trade is a loser) 
 SpreadPips is the pip value of the Bid-Ask spread (*) 
 TSize is the amount of currency units risked for a given transaction 
PipVal is value in monetary terms of a single pip of currency movement 
(*) This model assumes all transaction costs are included in the spread.  Overnight 
interest rate swaps have been ignored as a day-trading model has been assumed. 
 
This model helps answer the question as to how it is possible that in both the competition 
data and the Heimer – Simon study, that over 63% of trades were profitable, but traders still 
lost money overall.  If traders are risking more money for each losing trade, than they stand 
to gain for a winning trade, then the possibility exists for them to lose overall despite being 
right more than 50% of the time.  For example, risking 35 pips for a losing trade whilst only 
standing to gain 20 pips for a winning trade would be a valid scenario given the spread 
assumptions, a mean trade size of $34,580 and win-rate probability of around 63% would 
also give an overall profitably of -$6.20.   Data about actual stop loss and take profit levels 
used by the traders is not available in the Heimer – Simon study. 
 
Random Trading? 
The received wisdom in the Forex trading world is that skilled and knowledgeable traders 
take money from less skilled and less knowledgeable traders and the brokers (via the spread) 
take money from everyone.  But what would the results be if rather than a ‘more skilled – less 
skilled’ model was used, an entirely random model was assumed?  To test this a random 
trading simulator ‘Dom’ was created, designed to recreate as much of the Heimer – Simon 
study as practicable but using random buying and selling decisions.  Based on the 
MetaTrader 4 automated trading platform, Dom aimed to simulate effect of random trading 
on the larger set of 2,012 ‘Dedicated’ traders identified in the study.  This Heimer – Simon 
study defined the ‘Dedicated’ group as traders where “total trades by an individual must 
exceed the median [of the combined groups] 128 and the frequency with which they trade 
during a given week must also exceed the median 32.1.   The resulting partition of the sample 
involves 2,012 ‘Dedicated’ individuals who made 1,642,262 trades and 3,681 ‘Dabblers’ who 
made 506,821”.  The simulation used actual currency price data for the four major currency 
pairs from between January 2009 and December 2010, combined with other reported data 
such as  the mean starting account balance ($8,512) , the mean number of trades per trader 
(816) and mean trade size ($34,580 – or 0.3458 Lots).  Random trades were simulated over 
the given 2-year period in a ratio based on the popularity of the four major currency pairs, in 
the ratio reported in the Triennial Central Bank Survey.  Each run simulated one trader and 
trades were opened randomly in direction (buy or sell) and time of day.  Trades were closed 
after a random period of time, chosen to replicate the reported time trades remained open in 
the study (“Roughly half of all positions are closed within an hour and only around ten 
percent last longer than a day”).  The results of the random simulation are shown below, with 
the simulated overall profitability from the 2,012 traders sorted into descending order. 
  
  "Dedicated" "Dedicated" 
Data Observed – from study Random  - By simulation 
    
Profitable at end of period 17.80% 13.47% 
Mean Profit per trade -$5.49 -$5.79 
Mean profit per trader -$4,776 -$4,629 
Trader who lost all money - 31.50% 
No of traders 2,012 2,012 
No of trades 1,642,282 1,609,667 
Mean trades per trader 816.2 800 
Mean trade size $34,580 $34,580 
Mean starting balance $8,512 $8,512 
 
Whilst the mean losses per trader and mean profit show striking similarity (and demonstrate 
very close to the calculated results of 50% probability trading discussed earlier), there is a 
much lower level of profitable traders (13.47% vs 17.8%).  This may be attributed to the 
simplified use of a single mean starting balance ($8,512), trade size (0.3458 lots) and number 
of trades (800), verse the much wider variance suggested in the original data?  This modelling 
simplification certainly has the effect of narrowing the variance between maximum and 
minimum profitability per trader. 
 
The results can be split further into three broad sets of trading results, seen clearly on the 
graph; traders who were profitable (left), traders who lost some of their money (middle) and 
traders who lost all of their money (flat area on the right).  Whilst no data is available from 
the study as to how many traders lost all of their money, it was noted that “75 percent of all 
participants in our sample quit trading”.  
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Profit Distribution - Random "Dedicated" Simulation 
Binomial Distribution Model 
A second way to test for the similarity to random trading is to consider the results is binomial 
distribution model is used, into which the effect of a spread is added.  Each random ‘trade’ 
has the probability of 0.5, with an equal amount of money being risked on each trade, 
whether a winning or a losing trade. The result of each trade is debited or credited to a 
nominal account, the starting level of which is equal to that seen in the Heimer – Simon 
study.  Each trade additionally results in a fixed amount, equivalent to the ‘spread’ being 
removed from the resulting balances.  The binomial model used simulates a number of trades 
from the study and shows a normal distribution curve, shifted away from a midpoint of zero, 
reflecting the negative sum effect of the spread.  Using the Heimer – Simon data we get the 
following; 
 
 
 
The results can again be split into three categories; profitable, lost-some and lost-all.  In this 
model 21.3% of traders finished with a gain and 27.5% of traders finishing with a loss greater 
than their starting balance, in effect losing everything in their account.  Mean profit per trade 
and mean losses at the end are again very similar to those seen both in the random trading 
simulation and more importantly the study. 
 
  "Dedicated" "Dedicated" "Dedicated" 
Data Actual Random  - By 
simulation 
Random  - 
Binomial 
     
Profitable at end of period 17.80% 13.47% 21.30% 
Mean Profit per trade -$5.49 -$5.79 -$6.08 
Mean profit at end -$4,776 -$4,629 -$4,957 
Margin called accounts - 38.10% 34.50% 
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Profit after 816 trades 
Profitable Trader:  'Binomial - Spread' Distribution 
2012 Traders, 816 trades per trader
Starting balance $8,512 - Spread 1.753 - Trade size $34,560 
Frequency
No of traders 2,012 2,012 2,012 
No of trades 1,642,282 1,609,667 1,638,528 
Mean trades per trader 816.2 800 816 
Mean trade size $34,580 $34,580 $34,580 
Mean starting balance $8,512 $8,512 $8,512 
 
 
Conclusion  
The question “what are the realistic expectations for a retail FX trader to become profitable” 
can be split into two sub questions; ‘how many traders are in profit at any one time’ and ‘are 
these profits due to advantages in skill and knowledge ’?   The answer to this first question 
can be derived from studying the results of the trading competitions, broker collected data in 
the US and from the Heimer – Simon study.   Whilst it is very difficult to propose a single 
number to answer this question, it would be easy to conclude from this data that between a 
fifth and a third (20% and 33%) of retail FX traders are in profit at any time.  The higher end 
of this range however represents the status of the broker supplied data for open accounts, 
which by definition does not include accounts that were closed in the previous quarter, either 
via traders or via a margin call, due to losses. It is interesting to note that if a closure rate of 
40.9% was assumed, in line with the mean margin call figure, the ‘positive’ broker accounts 
would drop from 33.4% to just under 20%, far closer to the results seen elsewhere. 
 
  Traders Profitable Unprofitable Margin 
called 
Dedicated and Dabblers 
overall 
5,693 21.0% 79.0% n/a (1) 
Dedicated only 2,012 17.8% 82.2% n/a 
Computer simulation 
'Dedicated' 
2,012 13.5% 86.5% 38.1% 
Binomial simulation 
'Dedicated' 
2,018 21.3% 78.7% 34.5% 
Competition data 41,529 21.9% 78.1% 50.0% 
Broker data (2) 103,437 33.4% 66.6% n/a 
Mean   21.5% 78.5% 40.9% 
     
(1) “75 percent of all participants in our sample quit trading" [during two years of the 
study] 
(2) By definition data only shows open accounts.  Accounts closed (by losing traders) will 
not be included 
 
 
Germane to the profitability data is the fact that the retail FX market is a ‘negative-sum 
game’, that is to say that the transactional costs of each trade taken, primarily via the spread, 
will inevitably reduce the size of the trading funds available.  The implication of this is that a 
trader who is making trading decisions with an average of only a 50% chance of a positive 
contribution to their account, will simply drain their funds over time.   Additionally the trade 
win percentage data from the Heimer – Simon study and the FX competition data shows that 
traders should not confuse a higher than 50% win rate per trade with success either, as 
winning 65% of the time but losing twice as much as you win on each trade, will not result in 
a positive outcome over multiple trades.   
 
The second question to consider is ‘are profits due to the knowledge and skills edge that some 
traders have’?   If you were to hypothesise the premise that circa 20% of traders have the 
requisite edge in skills, then the profile of results you would see should include a small group 
of profitable ‘knowledgeable winners’, a larger group of unprofitable ‘less skilled’ traders 
and a final group, so poorly skilled, that have lost all of their trading funds.  Whilst we do see 
this three way split when analysing the trader profitability data, we also see a similar profile 
when looking the random trading scenarios.  The striking similarity in average trade 
profitability between the results in the two year Heimer – Simon study and those from the 
random simulation and mathematical modelling may suggest that the concept of a significant 
group of skilled and knowledgeable traders having an edge is illusionary and the profile is 
merely a result of a normal distribution of random results? 
 
It cannot be concluded that the FX market is a random walk and there is no edge to be found, 
only that, for the retail trader, the market is a negative sum game and that random trading or 
the trading of a random market would produce similar results to those observed. The Heimer 
– Simon study showed that the more successful of the two groups studied, the ‘Dedicated’, 
could only achieve a mean loss per trade of $5.49, a result which correlates to only a 50.5% 
success rate in our ‘edge’ model.   Overall the results are consistent with a random trading 
model, within which might be hidden a small element of ‘skilled – knowledgeable’ trading, 
however the models suggest that random distribution effect is far greater than this ‘skilled – 
knowledgeable’ impact.  Whether the ‘random’ effect is due to the nature of the FX market 
(the random-walk theory) or the net effectiveness of the retail trader would require further 
research to establish. 
 
Finally let us consider what the realistic expectations for a retail FX trader are?   To become a 
constantly profitable the trader would need an edge, sufficient in magnitude to overcome the 
effect of the negative-sum game.  This paper concludes that from the data reviewed, there is 
little evidence to suggest that a benefit from such a ‘knowledge edge’ exists in any widely 
discernible form.  This research also highlights the risk of a significant (greater than 80%) 
overall account loss is around double that of achieving profitability. A new trader should 
therefor ask themselves where they are going to acquire this edge from given that 
demonstrably the vast majority of retail market participants would appear not to be able to 
benefit from it.  Perhaps the final conclusions of this paper are to approach FX trading with 
your eyes open and seek independent financial advice before withdrawing your pension. 
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